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A CHANGE OF CLIMATE FOR COMPANY LAW 
 
At one time, while he was leader of the Labour Party, Ed Miliband talked about fighting 
µSUHGDWRU\ FDSLWDOLVP¶1 2QH RI /DERXU¶V PDQLIHVWR FRPPLWPHQWV in 2015 was to 
introduce employee representation on UK company compensation committees. This 
was a sop towards the long-held commitment by the Trade Union Congress to provide 
worker participation on supervisory boards essentially on the German model.2 The 
manner of the acquisition of BHS Plc by Philip Green in 2000 DQGWKHSD\PHQWRIµWKH
ODUJHVWSD\FKHTXHLQFRUSRUDWHKLVWRU\¶LQWKHIRUPRIDGLYLGHQGRIELOOLRQWRhis 
wife, &KULVWLQD³7LQD´ Green, in 2005, were part of the background music which led 
to that policy commitment. On acquiring the role of Prime Minister in July 2016, 
Theresa May promised employee participation on company boards and demanded that 
ZH ³JHW WRXJK RQ LUUHVSRQVLEOH EHKDYLRXU LQ ELJ bXVLQHVV´3 The backdrop to that 
undertaking was the scandal surrounding the failure of BHS and the massive under-
funding of its pension scheme.  
 
The treatment of BHS presents us with an important opportunity to draw clear lines as 
to what is acceptable and what is unacceptable in our economic life. The joint report of 
the Work and Pensions and the Business Innovation and Skills ³WP/BIS´ Velect 
committees on the collapse of BHS is excoriating about the role of Philip Green in 
running a healthy company with £500 million in assets into insolvency, while allowing 
the corporate pension fund to fall £571 million into deficit from a healthy surplus.4 
Companies and trusts under the control of the Greens bled colossal wealth from BHS 
at huge cost to eleven thousand employees, twenty thousand pensioners, and thousands 
of other people employed in the BHS supply chain.  
 
In this climate it is unlikely that there will not be legislative change of some sort to 
confront this sort of activity. However, it is Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, John 
McDonnell MP, who has produced the most detailed proposals to confront the activities 
of capitalists like Philip Green and his immolation of BHS. The policy was first trailed 
in The Mirror in the following way:5  
 
                                                 
1 The Guardian1RYHPEHUµ(G0LOLEDQGVHWVRXWILYH-point plan for more responsible 
FDSLWDOLVP¶ 
2 E.g. Aline Conchon, :RUNHUV¶9RLFHLQ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH$(XURSHDQ3HUVSHFWLYH, Trades 
8QLRQ&RQJUHVV³(FRQRPLF5HSRUW6HULHV´ 
3 Speech in Birmingham, 11 July 2016.  
4 :RUNDQG3HQVLRQVDQG%XVLQHVV,QQRYDWLRQDQG6NLOOV&RPPLWWHHV³%+6´+&-XO\
³:3%,6VHOHFWFRPPLWWHHUHSRUW´ 
5 The Mirror, 30 July 2016.  
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µ/DERXU¶V6KDGRZ&KDQFHOORUSODQVD³3KLOLS*UHHQODZ´WRVWRSILUPVEHLQJ
made into debt cash cows, after high street chain BHS was plunged into 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQHDUOLHUWKLV\HDU¶ 
 
Mr McDonnell makes six detailed proposals for the reform of company and takeover 
law.6 This article analyses those detailed proposals and explains how, with a series of 
slight changes to our company law rules, the immolation of other companies employing 
thousands of people can be prevented.  
 
 
THE ACQUISITION AND EXSANGUINATION OF BHS 
 
The exsanguination of BHS is a playbook for extracting personal wealth from a public 
company. It is the techniques of company law which make this possible. By analysing 
the way in which the assets of BHS were drained out of the company through offshore 
trusts and other companies under the control of the Green family, the necessary 
reforms of company law become clear. The exsanguination of a public company takes 
four stages: acquisition; subtraction of value through manufactured dividends; 
subtraction of value through third party fees and rents; and disposal.  
 
 
(1) The acquisition phase 
 
%+63OFZDVDµTXRWHG¶SXEOLFFRPSDQ\EHIRUHLWVDFTXLVLWLRQLQDWZKLFKSRLQW
it was taken private. The change from being quoted on the FTSE-100 and subject to 
the rules of the London Stock Exchange left BHS subject only to the comparative lack 
of oversight of a private company. This change in status also came before the 
Financial Services Authority began to introduce its full panoply of securities 
regulations in 2000. This meant that little information needed to be made publicly 
available compared to the reporting requirements on a listed company. The losers in 
this situation were the employees and the members of corporate pension fund.  
 
Philip Green notionally acquired BHS Plc for £200 million in 2000 although the 
company did come with £44.78 million in cash7 and the purchase was reportedly 
organised by West LB through an offshore family trust controlled by the Green 
family.8 Another problem which has arisen in relation to the acquisition of public 
companies is the reliance on debt which the company itself absorbs after the purchase. 
For example, the acquisition of the company which owned Liverpool Football Club 
by Mssrs Gillett and Holt involved the acquisition of shares in that company which 
was funded by debt taken out by Holt and Gillett. The arrangement was always that, 
once the shares had been acquired, the company would become responsible for 
repaying the debt. Therefore, the company was repaying the debt which was 
necessary to acquire its own shares. This left the shareholders free to extract value 
from the company in the form of dividends while their debts were discharged by the 
income from the football club.  
 
                                                 
6 This author was the originator of those proposals. This article is an opportunity to explore them in 
greater detail.  
7 Private Eye0D\µ,QWKH&LW\*UHHQ¶V%+6EDUJDLQ¶ 
8 The Economist, 29 May 2003 and ibid.  
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(2) Subtraction of value through dividends 
 
After BHS Plc was taken private, it became possible for the company to be immolated 
in the shadows. What is significant is the way in which dividends were generated 
quickly from BHS Ltd. In the period from 2002 to 2004, BHS Ltd generated £208 
million in post-tax profits and yet paid dividends of £414 million. Of this amount, the 
WP/BIS select committee report found that £307 million in dividends were paid to 
µWKH*UHHQIDPLO\¶9 As a simple question of arithmetic, those profits were funded by 
a lot more than profits taken from BHS Ltd. Instead, the WP/BIS select committee 
report found that WKHVHGLVWULEXWLRQVµUHPRYHGYDOXHIURPWKHFRPSDQ\¶E\GUDZLQJ
down its reserves, and using other cash from the business. Therefore, the owners were 
found to have been draining cash and liquidating other assets in the company for their 
personal gain.  
 
In situations in which debt is raised to fund the acquisition of the shares, and then 
assumed by the company itself after the acquisition, the company is draining value 
from elsewhere in the business both to set off the debt and to fund dividends when the 
distributions exceed the cash in the business.  
 
After the acquisition, Philip Green assembled the Arcadia group of companies 
through further acquisitions and then absorbed BHS Ltd into it. After the creation of 
the Arcadia group, Tina Green is said by the select committee to have UHFHLYHGµWKH
ODUJHVWSD\FKHTXHLQFRUSRUDWHKLVWRU\¶LQWKHIRUPRIDGLYLGHQGRIELOOLRQIURP
that group in 2005.10 This dividend was paid to a Jersey company, Global Textile 
Investments, controlled by Tina Green.11 Thus, indirectly, Tina Green, a resident of 
Monaco, took a huge sum in cash from the corporate group which included BHS Ltd. 
Philip Green told the WP/BIS select committee hearing that he considered these 
dividends, paid within a couple of years of acquiring the Arcadia companies, to be 
³conservative´.  
 
Another example of taking dividends from newly acquired companies arose in 
relation to the acquisition of the company which owns Manchester United Football 
Club. The debt which was necessary to acquire the shares in Manchester United was 
assumed by the company while members of the Glazer family acquired shares in the 
company. The company was loaded with more debt by means of a bond issue, the 
company was listed on the New York StocN([FKDQJHDQGWKHFOXE¶VKROGLQJ
company became resident in the Cayman Islands. These are the tools which company 
law offers to capitalists who want to extract value from their companies before 
making them trade at a profit.  
 
 
(3) Subtraction of value through third party fees 
 
Taking dividends from a company under your indirect control is only one way of 
H[WUDFWLQJYDOXHIURPLW$QRWKHUZD\LVWRRUJDQLVHIRUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VRWKHUDVVHWVWR
be liquidated and distributed among other controlled companies. An analysis by the 
                                                 
9 WP/BIS select Committee report, paragraph 10. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Private Eye, 13 May 2016. 
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Financial Times12 probed the movement of money and assets within the BHS and 
other companies controlled by the Greens. A different company controlled by the 
Greens and registered in Jersey, Carmen Properties Ltd, acquired twelve premises 
from BHS for £105 million and then raised rents of about £12 million per annum on 
those same properties by leasing them back to BHS. This process generated £153 
million by 2015.13 Yet another company owns the BHS headquarters, worth £40 
million. 
 
Through controlled companies, the Greens charged BHS ³fees´ for services like 
administration and distribution which (together with dividends and rents) amounted to 
£1.2 billion in total, again according to the Financial Times analysis.14 Administration 
charges levied by the Greens reached £58 million in 2013, even though profits in the 
Arcadia group generally were falling. This is how a modern capitalist extracts money 
from a company under their control: through dividends and through fees raised 
between controlled companies. The Financial Times considered that it had found as 
much as £400 million in fee and other income bled out in these ways which had not 
previously been public knowledge, leading to a total of £1.2 billion being taken out of 
BHS alone.  
 
The Greens did not increase turnover in BHS, even during the boom years of the 
economy at the start of the 21st century. Instead, they manufactured paper profits by 
cost-cutting (including sourcing products from low wage economies) and by asset 
liquidations (including sales-and-leasebacks of premises).15 At the same time, even 
during the economic boom, the pension fund was not maintained at the surplus which 
existed in 2002, as is considered below.16  
 
 
(4) The disposal phase 
 
The disposal of what remained of BHS 
 
By the time that the Greens had finished with BHS and sold it for £1 in March 2015, 
there was very little left. The balance sheet makes sobering reading.17 The BHS 
accumulated reserves fell from £228 million in 2002 to a deficit of £323 million by 
2014. Assets stood at £501 million when BHS was acquired in 2001, but had fallen to 
£295 million by 2014. Balance sheet liabilities had grown from £205 million to £551 
million over the same period. Most worryingly of all, the deficit in the company 
pension fund has grown to an estimated £571 million today. In other words, the 
pension deficit was larger in 2015 than the total assets of the company in 2000. 
 
 
The hole where a pension fund used to be 
 
                                                 
12 Financial Times$SULOµ+RZPXFKPRQH\GLGWKH*UHHQVPDNH"¶ 
13 WP/BIS select Committee report, paragraph 15. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid, paragraph 19 et seq. 
17 Ibid, paragraph 12. 
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The reason for disposing of a company like BHS, as opposed simply to winding the 
company up, is that any liabilities attaching to the company are transferred to the new 
owners. In BHS, the pension deficit grew steadily from a situation in which there was 
no deficit in 2002, to a £75 million deficit in 2005, a £139 million deficit in 2014, and 
then a colossal £571 million by 2016 (LIWKHVFKHPH¶VFRVWVZHUHWREHFRYHUHGE\DQ
insurer). Significantly, the pension fund was in deficit in 2005 during the boom years 
in the early 21st century and so the deficit cannot be blamed entirely on the financial 
crisis (which began in earnest in 2007). Rather, the funding of the pension scheme by 
the company simply tailed off. Another way to increase personal profits for the 
capitalist is to fail to keep funding the pension scheme. The select committee report 
demonstrates that the Pensions Regulator was insufficiently astute in the protection of 
that fund.  
 
 
The net effect 
 
Twenty thousand people ± past and present employees of BHS ± stand to lose their 
jobs and their pensions, with thousands more likely to lose their jobs in the supply 
chain. Pension fund losses are real. A company pension is deferred pay for the 
pensioners. The pensioners have contributed to the fund during their working lives 
and the company contracted with them to contribute to it too. For the capitalist to fail 
WRPDLQWDLQWKHSHQVLRQIXQGLVOLNHWDNLQJPRQH\RXWRIHPSOR\HHV¶SRFNHWVThe 
Pension Protection Fund set up by the last Labour government will have to step in to 
protect pension contributions. The welfare state will have to step in to care for 
workers who become unemployed. This is yet another example of the privatisation of 
profit and the socialisation of cost.  
 
Adam Smith did envisage a capitalism in which WKHULFKZRXOG³VHOHFWIrom the heap 
ZKDWLVPRVWSUHFLRXVDQGDJUHHDEOH´EXWin his view this was tempered by the moral 
QRWLRQWKDWWKHULFK³FRQVXPHOLWWOHPRUHWKDQWKHSRRU´DQGWKDWWKH³JXLGLQJKDQG´
would lead them to keep the economy in balance so that even the poor would become 
more comfortable.18 By contrast, Philip Green owns a 90 metre super-yacht called 
Lionheart which reputedly him cost £100 million. Adam Smith would not have 
recognised this form of capitalism because it generates incredible amounts of wealth 
for the super-rich 0.1% without maintaining any balance in society.  
 
It is time for our company law to stop conceiving of the company solely as property 
that is owned by its majority shareholders, because this is how super-capitalists like the 
Greens are able to exsanguinate those companies. Instead our company law must begin 
to think genuinely about the company as a community of employees, executive and 
non-executive directors, pensioners, creditors and consumers and, yes, shareholders 
too. Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 made some steps towards advancing 
recognition of the position of employees, customers, and the community more generally 
in companies. If we do recognise ± that is, genuinely recognise ± that there are other 
bundles of claims bound up with a company beyond the inter-action of directors and 
shareholders then we will begin to change our country for the better.  
 
                                                 
18 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759. 
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The question is what is to be done to prevent manipulative takeovers of public 
companies which are necessary to maintain jobs and the ordinary economy. With that 
in mind, ZHWXUQWR0U0F'RQQHOO¶VSURSRsals. These proposals should be understood 
as being mutually supporting, although the fifth proposal is central to their collective 
operation.  
 
 
 
THE SIX PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF CORPORATE LAW AFTER BHS 
 
1. Financial Assistance 
 
Identifying financial assistance 
 
7KHILUVWSURSRVDOLVWKDWWKHODZVRQµILQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFH¶VKRXOGEHUHGHILQHG7KLV
divides into two stages. First, the law must be changed so that it applies to private 
companies as well as to public companies, in particular private companies which have 
recently been converted from being public companies. Second, the concept of indirect 
financial assistance in s.678 of the Companies Act 2006 ³&$´ must be 
clarified so as to encompass the company being obliged to repay the loan which was 
used to buy shares in that company originally.  
 
There is a difficult line to draw between financial assistance which is paid in advance 
of a purchase of shares, and financial assistance which involves the company assuming 
responsibility for a debt which had paid for the shares previously. The only difference 
between these two payment structures is the sequencing. Otherwise the net effect is the 
same: the company has funded the purchase of shares in itself. Where the purchaser 
arranges with the lender of the purchase price that the repayments will be made by the 
company, then the company is being committed to funding the purchase price 
indirectly. The argument would run, from the purchaseU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH, that they do not 
control the company at the time that this undertaking is made to the lender, and that 
once the company is under their control then they can do what they like with it. The 
LPSRUWDQWSRLQWIURPWKHHPSOR\HHV¶DQGSHQVLRQHUV¶ perspectives is that the company 
immediately becomes less secure as a business, as an employer and as a provider of 
pension funding when it is so highly geared and when it is being used simply to fund 
WKHQHZVKDUHKROGHU¶Vextravagant lifestyle.  
 
The proposal is that s.678(1) of the CA 2006 would be expanded to include assistance 
given after the acquisition in the form of the assumption of the debt by the company as 
part of a previous arrangement, especially where that is part of a pre-arrangement 
between the lender and the purchaser of the company. The second statutory prohibition 
on financial assistance arises under s.678(3) of the CA 2006 if the purchaser of those 
shares takes on a liability and if the company then undertakes to reduce or expunge that 
liability: thus, indirectly passing value to the purchaser and so giving financial 
assistance. This would be re-cast so as to capture the transfer of the debt used to acquire 
shares in the company onto the company itself. $W SUHVHQW WKH WHUP ³ILQDQFLDO
assLVWDQFH´LVGHILQHGLQVVRDVWRLQFOXGHDVVLVWDQFHE\ZD\RIJLIWRUE\ZD\RI
guarantee or indemnity, or by way of a loan, or by way of any other arrangement such 
WKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VQHWDVVHWVDUHUHGXFHGWKXVLPSO\LQJWKDWYDOXHKDVVKLIWHGIURPthe 
company to some other person so as to acquire shares). The time sequencing of these 
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events would also be adjusted to include explicitly any prior arrangement that the 
company would take on the debt used to acquire shares in itself.  
 
 
The definition of financial assistance 
 
This reform would reframe s.678 of the CA 2006 so that there ZRXOGEH ³ILQDQFLDO
DVVLVWDQFH´ LI D SXUFKDVHU HQWHUHG LQWR D agreement, arrangement or understanding 
whereby money is agreed to be borrowed from a lender so that the purchaser can acquire 
a majority or controlling shareholding in a company, and if the legal liability for that 
debt is transferred directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, to the company after the 
purchase in accordance with that agreement, arrangement or understanding. This 
proposal would be expanding the concept of ³financial assistance´ slightly so as to 
include transactions of this sort in which the company indirectly funds the acquisition 
of the shareholding.  
 
In Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams Furniture Ltd (No2)19 Buckley LJ held that 
where there was a collateral purpose for the assistance which was not the acquisition of 
shares in the company, then there would not be financial assistance. This produced a 
simple mechanism for avoiding the financial assistance provisions by building a 
collateral purpose (which was more than a mere sham) into the arrangement. By 
contrast, in Charterhouse Investment Trust Ltd v Tempest Diesels Ltd20 Hoffmann J 
suggested that the acid test for financial assistance should be whether or not the 
FRPSDQ\¶VQHWDVVHWVZHUHUHGXFHGE\WKHWUDQVDFWLRQSimilarly, reducing the net assets 
RIWKHFRPSDQ\³WRDPDWHULDOH[WHQW´E\PHDQVRIproviding security for a loan will 
constitute financial assistance.21 In Charterhouse, Hoffmann J. held that, in essence, 
the question was whether or not there had been a net transfer of value by the company 
to the purchaser. Since that could not be shown on the facts of that case, there was held 
to be no financial assistance. However, when the company does suffer a reduction in 
its net assets by discharging the debt, then it is no great extension of the concept to 
provide that assuming the debt needed to acquire shares would constitute financial 
assistance.  
 
The House of Lords in Brady v Brady22 took a restrictive approach to financial 
assistance which will be maintained under this proposal in the wake of the treatment of 
BHS. As part of a family settlement there was a transfer of assets between two family 
companies involving paying off loan stock issued as part of the purchase price for 
shares. This was held to be financial assistance. Many company lawyers decried Lord 
Oliver¶VILQGLQJthat the ultimate purpose was to acquire shares even though there was 
an unrelated commercial objective. However, in the context of protecting companies 
from undesirable, highly-geared takeovers, this proposal would follow that narrow 
approach to identifying financial assistance.  
 
 
2. Dividends 
 
                                                 
19 [1980] 1 All ER 393.  
20 [1986] 1 BCLC 1. 
21 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No3) [1968] 1 WLR 497. 
22 [1989] AC 755. 
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Restricting dividends to earned profits 
 
The second proposal is linked to the first. In essence, dividends should not be allowed 
to be paid out of borrowed money or by the liquidation of assets in circumstances 
which will affect the success of the company or its pension fund. This reform is 
directed at situations like BHS or Manchester United. The Greens took over £1.5 
billion in dividends out of BHS and related companies in four years. The Glazer 
family took £15 million in dividends out of Manchester United in one year. 
Consequently, there must be a clarification of the law so that dividends can only be 
paid out of earned profits and not out of borrowed money, especially in relation to 
public companies recently taken private which are at risk of exsanguination. The 
requirement in s.830 of the Companies Act 2006 that dividends must be paid out of 
³SURILWVDYDLODEOHIRUWKHSXUSRVH´ZRXOGEHFODULILHGLQWKLVFRQWH[W7KHUHZRXOGDOVR
be closer controls on the liquidation of capital assets to pay dividends.  
 
This reform would make it clear that dividends can only be paid by a company within 
a given period of time after that company was taken over if they are paid out of earned 
income. The proposal, furthermore, is that dividends could only be paid out of income 
which has actually been received in cash by the company, and not future profit which 
is booked in the current profit-and-loss account as profit. For example, profit and loss 
DFFRXQWVSUHSDUHGRQD µPDUN-to-PDUNHW¶RU µIDLUYDOXH¶EDVLVZRXOGQRWQHFHVVDULO\
entitle the payment of dividends.  
 
 
Identifying available profits 
 
There are two principal concerns with dividends. First, that those who control the 
FRPSDQ\PLJKWVHHNWRGLVWULEXWHWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDODPRQJWKHPVHOYHVE\PHDQV
RIGHFODULQJDODUJHGLYLGHQGSD\DEOHRXWRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDODVRSSRVHGWRLWV
income. This would be prejudicial to the interests of unsecured creditors and others if 
WKHFRPSDQ\EHFDPHZRUWKOHVVWKDQLWKDGEHHQSUHYLRXVO\DVDUHVXOWRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
profits being bled out of its capital and reserves as dividends. Second, that the company 
may want to pay a large dividend to its shareholders when its profits for the financial 
year have been insufficiently large. To do this, a company may seek to declare a 
dividend which includes an amount of future profits which it expects to earn, for 
example, from sales which have been agreed but for which the purchase price has not 
yet been paid. Profit and loss accounts frequently include a fair value for sales which 
have been made even if the money has not been received; whereas cash flow statements 
exclude amounts which have not actually been paid yet.  
 
6HFWLRQRIWKH&$UHTXLUHVWKDWDQ\FRPSDQ\³PD\RQO\PDNHDGLVWULEXWLRQ
RXWRISURILWVDYDLODEOHIRUWKHSXUSRVH´7KLVapparently has the effect of limiting all 
distributions from the company to income amounts (that is, profits) which can be paid 
out at that time. There is a further requirement in relation only to public companies, 
XQGHUVRIWKH&$WKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VQHWDVVHWVZLOOVWLOOH[FHHGLWVVKDUH
capital and its reserves after the distribution. In the case of BHS, the dividend payments 
of £414 million were made after the company had been taken private and on profits of 
only £208 million.  
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The proposal in relation to public companies, and in relation to public companies which 
have been taken private within the five previous years, would be that dividends can 
only be paid out of cash and earned income. This proposal turns on the concept of 
profits which are available for distribution in this context.  
 
Section 830(2) of the CA 2006 defines the concept of available profits in the following 
terms: 
 
³$ FRPSDQ\¶V SURILWV DYDLODEOH IRU GLVWULEXWLRQ DUH LWV DFFXPXODWHG UHDOLVHG
profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution or capitalisation, less its 
accumulated, realised losses, so far as not previously written off in a reduction 
RUUHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIFDSLWDOGXO\PDGH´ 
 
6RZK\GRHVWKHFRQFHSWRIµUHDOLVHGSURILWV¶not exclude dividends which are paid out 
of money which has been acquired (directly or indirectly) through asset disposals and 
through new debt being imposed on the company? Read literally, this provision would 
mean that the profits must be profits which have actually been received in cash and not 
simply paper profits, but accountants clearly disagree. The proposal is to clarify that 
position in relation to takeovers and to amend the rules in relation to fair value 
accounting.  
 
 
3. The Takeover Code 
 
The third proposal is for amendments to the Takeover Code. Building on Principle 5 
of the Code ± to the eIIHFWWKDW³RIIHURUPXVWDQQRXQFHDELGRQO\DIWHUHQVXULQJWKDW
KHVKHFDQIXOILOLQIXOODQ\FDVKFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´± anyone proposing to acquire a 
public company must clarify how they will pay for the shares they are proposing to 
buy. Moreover, this proposal also builds on Principle 3 of the Code to place 
obligations on both bidder and offeree to commit to the best interests of the company. 
The purchaser must publish a clear strategy for the takeover for approval by the 
Takeover Panel which will show how they will promote the success of the company 
under the Companies Act 2006. That strategy must also make clear how they will 
maintain the pension fund and that strategy must also be approved by the Pensions 
Regulator. The Pensions Regulator,23 the Takeover Panel and the Financial Conduct 
Authority will have the ability to prevent the takeover within their regulatory 
competencies. 
 
The failure to contribute to the pension fund was the most scandalous failure in the 
BHS debacle. In a society in which the welfare state provision of pensions is being 
rolled back, the maintenance of corporate pension funds is essential. Therefore, 
preventing companies from having their assets stripped out of them in the form of 
dividends or other distributions is essential too.  
 
The strategy required by this proposal falls into two parts. First, the strategy must 
make clear how the purchaser intends to fund the purchase; whether or that would 
involve any new debt being imposed on the company after the acquisition; and 
whether any other burdensome liabilities would be imposed on the company with a 
                                                 
23 Since these proposals were made by Mr McDonnell, the Pensions Regulator has made public their 
belief that they should have this power: Financial Times, 13th August 2016. 
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benefit to the purchaser (or any connected person or any person with whom they are 
acting in concert) within five years of the acquisition. Second, the purchaser must 
make a clear statement as to the effect of the acquisition on employees of the 
company and the manner in which the pension will be funded.  
 
Principle 5 of the Code is important in this context. The issue is why it is not used so 
as to prevent takeovers when the purchaser does not have the cash to make the purchase. 
The answer is that many purchases are funded by debt and by other financial 
instruments in the form of securities, derivatives and so forth. The argument raised by 
the purchaser would be: I do have the cash because a bank will lend it to me. The 
concern identified above would be that the purchaser will then have that debt paid off 
by the company, at great cost to the employees of the company and to the economy at 
large. Therefore, the proposal is to amend the CA 2006 and the Code, by requiring that 
the purchaser is able to support the debt themselves or that they publish a strategy as to 
how any debt will be supported and its impact on the workers and pensioners in the 
company.  
 
Further to Rule 2.5 of the Code, the offeror should only announce a firm intention to 
make an offer once it has given the matter the most careful and responsible 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQWKHQWKLVHLWKHUOHDGVWRDµµILUPDQQRXQFHPHQW¶¶WUDLOLQJDQRIIHURUD
statement of an intention not to make an offer. The proposal is that the publication of a 
strategy for the funding of any debt and as to the future success of the company would 
be required at this point. The Takeover Panel and the Financial Conduct Authority 
would be empowered to resist the takeover at this point on the basis of the inadequacy 
of the strategy document. Alternatively, when a mandatory offer is required under Rule 
9 (once a person acquires, alone or in concert with others, 30 per cent of the voting 
rights in the offeree company) then the strategy must be published at that point as a pre-
condition to the offer process being commenced.  
 
 
4. Enhance minority shareholder rights 
 
The fourth proposal is to expand the rights of minority shareholders in s.260(3) of the 
Companies Act 2006 to bring derivative actions to object to a company being sold by 
the majority shareholders, or having significant transactions (such as sale-and-
leasebacks or administration fees) imposed on it, when that will not further the 
success of the company or when that would harm the maintenance of the pension 
fund. They must also be able to object to corporate strategies which will lead to the 
corporate pension fund falling into deficit. The shareholders in our largest public 
companies include pension funds and other institutions on which ordinary people rely. 
If those companies are sold off and gutted in the process, then it is ordinary people 
who will pay ultimately.  
 
7KHEDVLVIRUDGHULYDWLYHDFWLRQDVVHWRXWLQVRIWKH&$LVWKDWLW³PD\EH
brought only in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or 
omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director 
RI WKH FRPSDQ\´ 7KH SURSRVDO LV WR H[SDQG WKH OLVW RI DFWLRQV EH\RQG WKHVH IRXU
breaches so as to encompass, put bluntly, the disembowelling of a company like BHS. 
The real question will always be as to the trigger which would set off the action. The 
proposal is that the use of unearned, borrowed money to pay a dividend would be one 
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further head of action; another is the under-funding of the pension fund as considered 
below. 
 
That a derivative claim could be brought on grounds of negligence was once 
problematic. It used to be English law that one could only bring such actions if one 
could prove fraud. In Pavlides v Jensen24 it was held that no derivative action could be 
brought when a director sold company land at an under-value, because no fraud could 
be proved. However, Templeman J held in Daniels v Daniels25 that actions to bring a 
derivative claim need not be limited to cases of fraud. His Lordship held that:  
 
³LIPLQRULW\VKDUHKROGHUVFDQVXHLIWKHUHZDVIUDXG,VHHQRUHDVRQZK\WKH\
cannot sue where the action of the majority and directors, though without fraud, 
confers some benefit on the GLUHFWRUVDQGPDMRULW\VKDUHKROGHUVWKHPVHOYHV´ 
 
In that case the claimant shareholders sued when directors negligently sold land to one 
of their fellow directors at a fraction of its true market value. By extension this approach 
to the derivative action would be applied in statutory amendments to situations in which 
the owner-controllers of the company take some personal benefit from the company by 
way of fees, or dividends not funded by earned income, as was the case in relation to 
BHS. The new supervisory board (proposed under heading 5 below) would also be 
empowered under statute to bring such an action as a derivative action on behalf of the 
company. 
 
There are further company law doctrines which recognise the spirit of seeking the 
success and well-being of the company in places other than the wishes and wealth of 
the majority shareholders. James LJ held in 0HQLHUY+RRSHU¶V7HOHJUDSK:RUNV26 that 
where the majority shareholders had purported to devolve to themselves the right to 
divide the company's assets up between the majority shareholders then that it would be 
a  
 
³VKRFNLQJWKLQJLIWKDWFRXOGEHGRQHEHFDXVHLIVRWKHPDMRULW\PLJKWGLYLGH
the whole assets of the company, and pass a resolution that everything must be 
given to them, and that the miQRULW\VKDOOKDYHQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKLW´ 
 
Evidently then, even if the majority has the power to do something in theory, it will not 
always be permitted to exercise that power if its exercise would be abusive. This should 
be the trigger in cases like the immolation of BHS where millions in assets in BHS were 
bled out of the company and the pension fund left under-funded.  
 
These derivative action cases provide a useful ethic for the entirety of the area of law 
in which one group of shareholders or directors exsanguinates the company of its assets 
and leaves the pension deliberately and significantly under-funded. The principal utility 
of the Salomon doctrine in this context is that it recognises the existence of a set of 
benefits in the company as a separate entity as being superior to the financial well-being 
of the majority shareholders (or those who control them) personally. A trading company 
as an entity embodies (in the jurisprudential sense) a set of needs and objectives which 
                                                 
24 [1956] Ch 565.  
25 [1978] Ch 406.  
26 (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 350.  
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relate to the success of that business, the prosperity of its employees and trading 
partners, and the needs of the real economy.  
 
 
5. Supervisory boards ± worker and pensioner rights 
 
The fifth proposal is a significant reform which has been too long in the waiting in our 
company law: supervisory boards must be created for UK companies. In principle, 
this proposal now has the backing of both the Conservative Government (since the 
assumption of the role of Prime Minister by Theresa May) and the Labour Opposition. 
For the purposes of the reform of company law to meet the problems raised by BHS, 
these boards would give rights to workers and pensioners to be involved in the 
FRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQ-making. The supervisory board would have the power to object 
to a takeover of the company on grounds that the takeover would adversely affect the 
rights of workers or the pension fund. The only protection against predatory 
capitalists taking companies over and exsanguinating them is to empower a 
supervisory board to prevent those actions before they take effect, or to refuse to 
ratify them after the event.   
 
This proposal draws the previous four proposals together. The supervisory board, 
comprising representatives of the workforce and the pensioners, will be given powers 
to object to takeovers, to object to the payment of dividends and to object to asset sales 
where they threaten the success of the company, the capital base of the company or the 
maintenance of the pension fund. In consequence, rights would be given to that board 
to resist takeovers in the form of outright refusal, or a cooling-off period, or a complaint 
to the Secretary of State for Business for a ruling, or a referral to court to ask whether 
there would be oppression of workers or pensioners.  
 
Furthermore, within the supervisory board, the workers would be entitled to resist a 
takeover (thus triggering the legal action outlined above) if they considered that on the 
balance of probabilities the takeover would result in their wages not being paid or their 
jobs being lost, or the success of the company under s.172 of the CA 2006 being 
otherwise put at risk. The statute would introduce a balancing act for the court to 
perform between the future solvency or success of the company (if not taken over) and 
the impact on the workers. In this way, the future well-being of the company would be 
protected as a commercial entity in parallel with the rights and needs of workers. 
Similarly, the pensioners would be entitled to resist a takeover if it was more likely than 
not that the pension fund would not be fully funded (to within a level established by 
actuarial calculations). Again, the court would have to perform a similar balancing act 
between the shot-term well-being of the company and the position of the pension fund. 
These rights would overlap with the strategy required above in relation to a takeover.  
 
 
6. Claw back 
 
7KHVL[WKSURSRVDOLVWKDWWKHUHZLOOEHDVWDWXWRU\³FODZEDFN´SURYLVLRQWRUHFRYHU
any dividends which are funded indirectly by debt or which breach with any of the 
other principles set out above. It often happens that these cases end up in the 
insolvency courts (as is the case with the insolvency of BHS which is now in 
administration). Insolvency law already contains claw back provisions (for example, 
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in s.423 of the Insolvency Act 1986). These proposals enable the courts to order a 
claw back of assets several years after the transfer away of the assets in the form of 
the dividend.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Memorably, in Rolling Stone Matt Tiabbi described US investment bank Goldman 
Sachs as being like a great vampire squid ³UHOHQWOHVVO\ jamming its blood funnel into 
anything that smells like money´.27 There is something of great vampire squid in the 
exsanguination of companies like BHS: sucking the lifeblood out of them before selling 
off the husk. In the 1980s we would have called this ³asset-stripping´. In that era, large 
conglomerates would be dismembered and sold off on the principle that the parts were 
worth more separately than the sum of those parts. In situations like BHS, the corporate 
presence of the company is left intact but the cash value is sucked out of it: the 
extraction of cash through fees and dividends has replaced the division of the company 
into its component parts for sale. The Greens acquired a company with assets worth 
£500 million and a pension fund in surplus, but they left a company with a market value 
of only £1 and a pension deficit of £571 million. In the meantime, they had taken an 
estimated £1.2 billion personally from BHS alone. At the same time 11,000 employees 
are threatened with losing their jobs and 20,000 people entitled under the pension fund 
are awaiting rescue. The husk was then sold off in an effort to distance the previous 
owners from any legal liabilities in relation to it.  
 
Company law must change to prevent this sort of misuse of public companies, and the 
harm that causes to society more generally, from being repeated. The Pensions 
Regulator must also be empowered to regulate company pension funds more closely 
and to compel proper funding. The Takeover Panel must be empowered to resist 
takeovers brought by unfit people. What must be avoided is the outcome that now faces 
twenty thousand people closely connected to BHS.  
 
Philip Green has come to symbolise the type of capitalist Vaughan Williams J28 and 
Lindley LJ29 IHDUHG$URQ6DORPRQ¶VFDVHZRXOGFUHDWH Lopes LJ could have been 
WDONLQJDERXW3KLOLS*UHHQZKHQKHKHOGWKDW³,WZRXOGEHODPHQWDEOHLIDVFKHPH
OLNHWKLVFRXOGQRWEHGHIHDWHG´30 With a few changes to our company law, it can be 
defeated in the future.  
 
  
 
                                                 
27 Reproduced in M Taibbi, Griftopia 1HZ<RUN6SLHJHO	*UDX&KDSWHU³7KH*UHDW$PHULFDQ%XEEOH
0DFKLQH´Set seq. 
28 Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323. 
29 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1895] 2 Ch 323. 
30 [1895] 2 Ch 323. 
